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Abstract. In situations without central coordination, the price of anar-
chy relates the quality of any Nash equilibrium to the quality of a global
optimum. Instead of assuming that all players choose their actions si-
multaneously, here we consider games where players choose their actions
sequentially. The sequential price of anarchy, recently introduced by Paes
Leme, Syrgkanis, and Tardos [11], then relates the quality of any sub-
game perfect equilibrium to the quality of a global optimum. The effect of
sequential decision making on the quality of equilibria, however, depends
on the specific game under consideration. Here we analyze the sequential
price of anarchy for atomic congestion games with affine cost functions.
We derive several lower and upper bounds, showing that sequential de-
cisions mitigate the worst case outcomes known for the classical price of
anarchy [5, 2]. Next to tight bounds on the sequential price of anarchy, a
methodological contribution of our work is, among other things, a “fac-
tor revealing” integer linear programming approach that we use to solve
the case of three players.
1 Model and Notation
We consider atomic congestion games with affine latency functions. The input
of an instance I ∈ I consists of a finite set of resources R, a finite set of players
N = {1, . . . , n}, and for each player i ∈ N a collection Ai of possible actions
Ai ⊆ R. In other words, each players’ action is to choose a subset of resources Ai
that are feasible for him. We say a resource r ∈ R is chosen by player i if r ∈ Ai,
where Ai is the action chosen by player i. By A = (Ai)i∈N we denote a possible
outcome, that is, a complete profile of actions chosen by all players i ∈ N .
Each resource r ∈ R has a constant activation cost dr ≥ 0 and a variable cost
or weight wr ≥ 0 that expresses the fact that the resource gets more congested
the more players choose it. The total cost of resource r ∈ R, for some outcome
A, is then fr(A) = dr + wr · nr(A), where nr(A) denotes the number of players
choosing resource r in outcome A. Given outcome A, the negative utility of player
i is the total cost of all resources chosen by that player costi(A) =
∑
r∈Ai fr(A).
Players aim to minimize their costs. For later convenience, the total constant
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costs of a set of resources T ⊆ R is denoted by d(T ) = ∑r∈T dr, and the total
weight of a set T ⊆ R is denoted by w(T ) = ∑r∈T wr. The total cost over all
players of an outcome A is denoted by cost(A) =
∑
i∈N costi(A).
Note that this class of problems includes as a special case the celebrated
network routing games as studied e.g. in [2, 13], where the resources R are net-
work arcs, and actions for any player i are origin-destination paths Ai for that
player. Another special case is singleton congestion games, where actions Ai are
all singletons, |Ai| = 1. Here, resources R can be thought of as machines or
servers, with processing speeds w−1r , and each player selects, from a given subset
of machines Ai, a single machine to be processed on. This model, and variants
thereof, are also known as load balancing games and, with respect to the quality
of equilibria, have a vast literature, e.g. [10, 4, 15].
Pure Nash equilibria are outcomes (Ai)i∈N in which no player can decrease
her costs by unilaterally deviating from choosing Ai. The price of decentraliza-
tion, better known as the price of anarchy PoA [8], measures the quality of any
Nash equilibrium relative to the quality of a globally optimal allocation, OPT .
Here OPT is an outcome minimizing the total costs over all players1. More
specifically, for an instance I,
PoA(I) = max
NE∈NE(I)
cost(NE)
cost(OPT )
, (1)
where NE(I) denotes the set of all Nash equilibria for instance I. The price of
anarchy of a class of instances I is defined by PoA(I) = supI∈I PoA(I).
In this paper our goal is to compare the quality of Nash equilibria to the
quality of subgame perfect equilibria of an extensive form game as introduced in
[9, 14]. We assume that the players choose their actions in an arbitrary, predefined
order 1, 2, . . . , n, so that the i-th player must choose his action Ai, observing the
actions of players preceding i, but of course not knowing the actions of the players
succeeding him. A strategy Si then specifies for player i the actions he chooses,
one for each potential profile of actions chosen by his predecessors 1, . . . , i − 1.
We denote by S a strategy profile (Si)i∈N . The outcome A = (Ai)i∈N of a game
is then the set of actions chosen by each player resulting from a given strategy
profile S. Note that, if S is a strategy profile of a subgame perfect equilibrium,
the resulting outcome A = (Ai)i∈N is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium of
the corresponding strategic form game; we will come back to this issue later in
Section 4.1.
Extensive form games can be represented in a game tree, with the nodes on
one level representing the possible situations that a single player can encounter,
and the edges emanating from any node representing the possible actions of that
player in the given situation. The nodes of the game tree are also called infor-
1 Note that we consider a utilitarian global objective, that is, the global objective is
to minimize the sum of the costs of all players. This is one of the standard models,
yet different than the egalitarian makespan objective as studied, e.g., in [8].
mation sets2. See Figure 2 for an example. Subgame perfect equilibria, defined
by Selten [14], are defined as strategy profiles that induce Nash equilibria in any
subgame of the game tree. Analogous to (1), the sequential price of anarchy of
an instance I is defined by
SPoA(I) = max
SPE∈SPE(I)
cost(SPE)
cost(OPT )
, (2)
where SPE(I) denotes the set of all subgame perfect equilibria of instance I in
extensive game form. The sequential price of anarchy of a class of instances I
is defined as in [11] by SPoA(I) = supI∈I SPoA(I). Throughout the paper, when
the class of instances is clear from the context, we write PoA and SPoA.
2 Related Work and Contribution
Recently, the sequential price of anarchy was introduced by Paes Leme et al.
[11] as an alternative way to measure of the costs of decentralization. Compared
to the classical price of anarchy of Papadimitriou and Koutsoupias [8], it avoids
the “curse of simultaneity” inherent in certain games [11]. More specifically, for
machine cost sharing games, generic unrelated machine scheduling games and
generic consensus games, the SPoA is smaller than the PoA [11]. However, for the
latter two games, the ‘generic’ condition is indeed necessary [3]. Moreover, Bilo`
et al. [3] show that for many games myopic behaviour leads to better equilibria
than the farsighted behaviour of subgame perfect equilibria. Also for throughput
scheduling games, or more generally, set packing games, the SPoA is lower than
the PoA [6]. For isolation games, however, the SPoA is worse than the PoA in
general [1]. These results leave a mixed impression, and lead to the natural
question which classes of games possess a SPoA which is lower than the PoA. We
give a (partial) answer to this question for atomic congestion games with affine
cost functions. Congestion games have been introduced by Rosenthal [12]. For
this class of games, the price of anarchy is known to equal 2 in the case of two
players, and 2.5 in the case of three or more players [5, 2].
Our contributions are both lower and upper bounds on the sequential price of
anarchy for atomic congestion games with affine cost functions. For two players,
we prove a tight bound of 1.5. For three players, we use integer linear program-
ming to obtain a tight bound of 2 63488 ≈ 2.13. This bound is obtained by first using
simple combinatorial arguments to show that the worst case must be attained
by some instance that is moderate in size, and then computing this worst case
instance with a standard ILP solver. For n > 3 players, we were not (yet) able
to prove a constant upper bound, which we conjecture to be smaller than 2.5.
We know that 2 63488 ≤ SPoA ≤ n, and when the number of players increases, we
give a parametric family of instances that yields a lower bound of 2 +1/e ≈ 2.37
on the SPoA. We also consider the special case of singleton congestion games
2 We deal with a game with perfect information, so all information sets are trivial,
and subgame perfect equilibria correspond to backward induction equilibria.
for which the PoA is 2.5 [4]. Here, the parametric lower bound example with
SPoA = 2 + 1/e holds, and we find an upper bound slightly smaller that trivial,
namely n− 1. The latter is interesting mainly for the case of n = 3 players. We
substantially improve on these results for symmetric singleton congestion games,
where we show that the SPoA equals 4/3, which matches the bound known for
the PoA [7]. Along the way, we present some additional insights.
3 An Illustrative Example
Example 1. There are two players N = {1, 2}, and three resources R = {1, 2, 3}
with zero constant costs and weights w1 = w2 = 1, w3 = 2. Player 1 can choose
either resource 1 or resource 2. Player 2 can choose either resource 2 or resource
3. This example is shown in Figure 1. /
1 2
w1 = 1 w2 = 1 w3 = 2
1 2
w1 = 1 w2 = 1 w3 = 2
OPT SPE
Fig. 1. A simple example. Dots represent to players, squares represent resources, and
edges represent actions. Fat edges correspond to chosen actions
It is clearly optimal when player 1 chooses resource 1, and player 2 chooses
resource 2, since in that case, both players choose their action of minimum
weight and the resources do not overlap. However, in the worst case subgame
perfect equilibrium, player 1 chooses resource 2, and player 2 chooses resource
3. Note that player 2 chooses resource 3, since his total costs are the same as
when he would choose resource 2. Also note that player 1 chooses resource 2
due to his farsighted behaviour; he knows player 2 will not choose resource 2 in
this equilibrium. The latter observation might seem counterintuitive, especially
since choosing resource 2 is a weakly dominated strategy for player 1 in the
corresponding strategic form game. However, we can easily convert all lower
bound examples in this paper to examples with unique (and strict) equilibria.
For this example we could decrease the weight of resource 2 by some small
constant , and decrease the weight of resource 3 by 3.
We see from this example that SPoA ≥ 1+21+1 = 1.5. It turns out that this simple
example yields a tight bound, as we show in the next section.
4 The Sequential Price of Anarchy for Two Players
We now prove that SPoA ≤ 1.5, which along with the observation of Section 3
shows that the sequential price of anarchy for atomic congestion games with
linear latency functions for 2 players is exactly 1.5.
We need the following notation: Denote by OPT = (A11, A21) the pair of
actions of two players 1 and 2, respectively, in an optimal allocation. Denote by
SPE = (A12, (A22, A23)) the actions in any subgame perfect equilibrium. Here,
A11, A12 ∈ A1, and A21, A22, A23 ∈ A2. This notation should be understood
as follows: In SPE player 1 prefers to choose A12. If player 1 were to choose
A11, then it is subgame perfect for player 2 to choose A22. If player 1 were to
choose A12, then it is subgame perfect for player 2 to choose A23. Note that both
players might have more actions at their disposal, however these are not relevant
for the analysis. It suffices to consider two actions for the first player, one for the
optimal allocation, A11, and one for the subgame perfect equilibrium, A12. For
the second player, it suffices to consider the action for the optimal allocation,
A21, plus the actions that player 2 were to play in reaction to A11 and A12, which
are A22 and A23, respectively. Also note that we do not exclude cases where any
two sets from A11, A12, A21, A22 or A23 overlap. It could even be that they are
equal. The general situation is shown in Figure 2.
A11
A21
A12
x11, y11 x12, y12 x13, y13 x21, y21 x22, y22 x23, y23
player 1
player 2
A22 A23 A21 A22 A23
Fig. 2. All relevant actions in the game tree for 2 players. Values at the leaves denote
the costs for both players. Fat lines correspond to subgame perfect actions.
For ease of notation, let a = d(A11), b = d(A21), α = w(A11 \ A21), β =
w(A21 \A11), γ = w(A11 ∩A21), δ = w(A11 ∩A22)−w(A11 ∩A21). So δ denotes
the difference in the total weight of shared resources, when player 1 chooses
A11 and player 2 switches from A21 to A22. Let xab = cost1(A1aA2b) and let
yab = cost2(A1aA2b). Then, cost(OPT ) = x11 + y11 = a+ α+ b+ β + 4γ. Since
player 2 prefers y12 to y11, we get y12 ≤ y11 = b + β − 2δ + 2(γ + δ). We prove
the theorem by upper bounding cost(SPE), by deriving an upper bound on x23
(Lemma 1), and two upper bounds on y23 (Lemmas 2 and 3).
Lemma 1. x23 ≤ a+ α+ 2γ + δ
Proof. x23 ≤ x12 = d(A11) + w(A11) + w(A11 ∩ A22) = a+ (α+ γ) + (γ + δ) =
a+ α+ 2γ + δ. The inequality follows from the fact that player 1 prefers x23 to
x12. The first equality follows from the definition of x12; it denotes the costs for
player 1 when player 1 chooses A11 and player 2 chooses A22. uunionsq
Lemma 2. y23 ≤ 2(b+ β + γ − δ)
Proof. y23 ≤ y22 ≤ d(A22) + 2w(A22) ≤ 2(d(A22) +w(A22)). The first inequality
holds since player 2 prefers y23 to y22. The second inequality follows from the
fact that each resource can be chosen by at most two players. We now show that
d(A22) + w(A22) ≤ b + β + γ − δ, proving the lemma. Since player 2 prefers
y12 to y11, we get y12 ≤ y11 = b + β + 2γ = b + β − 2δ + 2(γ + δ). Since
y12 = d(A22) + w(A22 \ A11) + 2w(A11 ∩ A22) and w(A11 ∩ A22) = γ + δ,
we get d(A22) + w(A22 \ A11) ≤ b + β − 2δ. Therefore d(A22) + w(A22) =
d(A22) + w(A11 ∩A22) + w(A22 \A11) ≤ b+ β + γ − δ. uunionsq
Lemma 3. y23 ≤ a+ α+ b+ β + 3γ
Proof. y23 ≤ y22 ≤ d(A22) + w(A22) + w(A12). The first inequality holds since
player 2 prefers y23 to y22. The second inequality follows from the fact that each
resource that player 1 chooses adds at most the weight of that resource to the
cost of player 2. We know from the proof of Lemma 2 that d(A22) + w(A22) ≤
b+β+γ−δ. We know from the proof of Lemma 1 that x12 ≤ a+α+2γ+δ. Player
1 could secure himself a total cost of x12 by choosing A11. Since he chooses A12
in SPE, w(A12) ≤ x12 ≤ a + α + 2γ + δ. Now d(A22) + w(A22) + w(A12) ≤
b+ β + γ − δ + a+ α+ 2γ + δ = a+ α+ b+ β + 3γ. uunionsq
Theorem 1. SPoA = 1.5 for atomic congestion games with two players and
affine cost functions.
Proof. Recall, cost(OPT ) = x11+y11 and cost(SPE) = x23+y23. Using Lemmas
1, 2 and 3, we get 2(x23+y23) ≤ 2a+2α+2(2γ+δ)+2(b+β+γ−δ)+a+α+b+
β+3γ = 3a+3α+3b+3β+9γ ≤ (x11 +y11) 3a+3α+3b+3β+9γa+α+b+β+4γ ≤ 3(x11 +y11). uunionsq
4.1 Reflection on Proof Techniques
The above proof is quite lengthy, especially considering the simplicity of our lower
bound example. However, contrary to what one might expect, not every outcome
of a subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
strategic form game3. Also, as with Nash equilibria, it is possible that both
players have a higher cost than in the optimum. These two effects are illustrated
in the following example.
3 Note that both games have different strategy spaces: In the strategic form game
both players have as strategy space their feasible actions, Ai. In the extensive form
game, however, the strategy space for the second player is more-dimensional, as it
specifies an action A2 ∈ A2 for all information sets (= possible actions of player 1).
Example 2. There are two players N = {1, 2}, and four resources R = {1, 2, 3, 4}
with zero constant costs dr = 0,∀r ∈ R and weights w1 = 7, w2 = 4, w3 =
1, w4 = 19. Player 1 can choose either resource 1 or resources {1, 2, 3}. Player 2
can choose either resources {1, 2} or resources {3, 4}. This example is shown in
Figure 3. /
1
2
w1 = 7 w2 = 4 w3 = 1 w4 = 19
1
2
w1 = 7 w2 = 4 w3 = 1 w4 = 19
OPT SPE
Fig. 3. In this example the SPE is bad for both players. Dots represent players, and
squares represent resources. Fat lines correspond to chosen resources. Note that lines
do not represent actions, only resources that can be chosen.
In the social optimum, player 1 chooses resource 1, and player 2 chooses resources
{3, 4}, which yields a total cost of 7 + (1 + 19) = 27. However, if player 1 were
to choose resource 1, then it is subgame perfect for player 2 to choose {1, 2},
which yields him a cost of 7 · 2 + 4 = 18 ≤ 19 + 1 = 20. This yields player 1 a
cost of 7 · 2 = 14. Therefore it is subgame perfect for player 1 to choose {1, 2, 3},
since then it is subgame perfect for player 2 to choose {3, 4}, which yields him
a cost of 19 + 2 · 1 = 21 ≤ 2 · 7 + 2 · 4 = 22. In this equilibrium, player 1 has
cost 7 + 4 + 2 · 1 = 13. Note that both players have higher cost in SPE than
in OPT . Also, the subgame perfect equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium of the
corresponding strategic form game, since player 1 plays an action that is strictly
dominated in the strategic form game.
This example shows that well known proof techniques, like smoothness or
potential arguments are problematic in a sequential setting; the arguments typ-
ically rely on the fact that in a Nash equilibrium outcome, no player is willing
to deviate.
5 The Sequential Price of Anarchy for Three Players
Along the lines of the proof for the case with two players, we also settle the case
with three players. To that end, we use an integer linear programming (ILP)
approach. We first use simple combinatorial arguments to argue that a worst
case instance is moderate in size. This is done in Lemmas 4, 5, and 6. We then
simply compute a worst case instance using a standard ILP solver. To prove the
lemmas, we use the following notation: Define the series
x1 := 2 and xi := 1 +
∏
j≺i
xi for all i ≥ 2 .
Note that x2 = 3, x3 = 7, x4 = 43, and that xi grows super-exponentially.
Lemma 4. For any instance I, there exists an instance I ′ with |Ai| ≤ xi for all
players i ∈ N for which SPoA(I ′) = SPoA(I).
Proof. The proof goes by successively eliminating all actions that are not played
in a fixed worst case SPE from I, in the order of the players 1, 2, . . . , n. For the
first player, we thereby reduce A1 to only two actions, one in OPT and one in a
worst case SPE. For the second player, we thereby restrict A2 to x2 ≤ 3 actions,
the SPE actions in two information sets, one for each possible action of the first
player, plus the action in OPT . More generally, for the kth player, we reduce
Ak to at most 1 +
∏
i≺k xi actions, namely the subgame perfect actions of the
fixed SPE in each of the at most
∏
i≺k xi information sets, plus the action in
OPT . In the so reduced instance, the SPE that we started with is still subgame
perfect, as the actions that were removed are all actions with inferior or identical
outcome for the respective player. uunionsq
Lemma 5. For any instance I, there exists an instance I ′ with |Ai| ≤ xi for
all players i ∈ N , and any two resources are not part of the exact same set of
actions, and hence, |R| ≤ 2
∑
i∈N |Ai|, and SPoA(I ′) = SPoA(I).
Proof. By Lemma 4, we may restrict w.l.o.g. to instances I with |Ai| ≤ xi for
all players i. Suppose the claim is false. Then choose among all instances I that
falsify the claim an instance with minimal set of resources R. Let r and r′ be two
resources that are part of the exact same set of actions. We construct an instance
I ′ which is a identical to I, except instead of r and r′, it contains a resource r′′
for which wr′′ = wr+wr′ and dr′′ = dr+dr′ . Now note that I
′ has the same sets
of actions as I. Now each outcome (Ai)i∈N in I ′ has the same costs as (Ai)i∈N
in I. Therefore the same actions are subgame perfect and SPoA(I ′) = SPoA(I).
As I ′ has one resource less, we obtain a contradiction. Finally, due to the fact
that no two resources are part of the exact same set of actions, and since there
are in total no more than
∑
i∈N |Ai| actions, by the pigeonhole principle there
cannot be more than 2
∑
i∈N |Ai| resources. uunionsq
Lemma 6. For any instance I, there exists an instance I ′ with |Ai| ≤ xi for
all players i ∈ N , any 2 resources are not part of the exact same set of actions,
|R| ≤ 2
∑
i∈N |Ai| and dr + wr ≤ n cost(OPT ) for all resources r ∈ R, such that
SPoA(I ′) = SPoA(I).
Proof. The first three claims follow by the two previous lemmas. Next, observe
that resources r with dr + wr > n cost(OPT ) can safely be eliminated, as it
cannot be subgame perfect for any player i to choose resource r: choosing OPT i
instead, the action that player i chooses in the optimal allocation, yields a cost
at most n cost(OPT i) ≤ n cost(OPT ) < dr + wr. uunionsq
Specifically, for congestion games with three players, in order to find a worst-
case instance we only need to consider instances of moderate size. It suffices
to let A1 = 2,A2 = 3,A3 = 7, |R| = 22+3+7, any 2 resources are not in the
exact same set of actions and dr + wr ≤ 3 cost(OPT ) for all resources r ∈ R.
Intuitively, the ILP works as follows: It maximizes the SPoA over all instances
with the properties described above. Let A = ⋃i∈N Ai denote the set of all 12
actions. We have 212 = 4096 resources, one for every possible combination of
actions. The ILP decides the weight wr and constant cost dr of each resource.
We define some fixed outcome as the social optimum with total cost normalized
to 1, and maximize the SPE.
The details of the ILP are given in the appendix, section A. We have im-
plemented this integer linear program using the AIMMS modeling framework,
and using CPLEX 12.5 we obtain an optimal solution with value 2 63488 . In that
solution, player 3 only uses 4 different actions. The resulting instance (scaled
to integer values) is given in the appendix, section B, where we omit all trivial
actions and resources. We conclude this section with the following.
Theorem 2. SPoA = 2 63488 ≈ 2.13 for atomic congestion games with three play-
ers and affine cost functions.
This result is particularly interesting in comparison to the tight bound 2.5 for
the price of anarchy for (non-sequential) three player congestion games [5, 2].
6 Results for n > 3 players
Given the techniques used so far, problems with n > 3 players become increas-
ingly difficult. Due to the the specific value 2 63488 for 3 players, it seems unlikely
that we can find a simple, general bound using combinatorial arguments. Ex-
tending the ILP straightforwardly to the case with 4 players is also problematic;
using Lemma 6, we’d need to consider 2 · 3 · 7 + 1 = 43 actions for player 4, and
255 resources. However, it is not unexpected that most of the gigantic amount
of variables remain nonbasic (for three players we only need 2+3+4 actions
and 13 resources), which leaves ample room for future computational work and
progress, e.g., using column generation. While we leave this for future work, here
we present results for the special case of singleton congestion games.
6.1 A Lower Bound for Singleton Congestion Games
Here we construct a class of parametric lower bound examples G(a, b), for in-
tegers a, b ≥ 0, to prove a lower bound on the sequential price of anarchy for
singleton congestion games that approaches 2 + 1/e as the number of players
increases.
Theorem 3. Asymptotically for n → ∞, SPoA ≥ 2 + 1e ≈ 2.37 for singleton
atomic congestion games with linear cost functions.
The proof is by the following parametric set of instances.
Example 3. The set of players N is partitioned into subsets N1, . . . , Na,
Na+1,. . . , Na+b. Any subset Nj , j ∈ {1, . . . , a} consists of b! players. Any subset
Nj , j ∈ {a+ 1, . . . , a+ b} consists of b!(j−a)! players. The set of resources R, |R| =
n+1 is partitioned into subsets R1, . . . , Ra, Ra+1, . . . , Ra+b+1. Subset R1 consists
of b! resources of weight 2−a+1, any subset Rj , j ∈ {2, . . . , a} consists of b!
resources of weight 2j−a−1 (note that these weights are between 0 and 1), any
subset Rj , j ∈ {a + 1, . . . , a + b} consists of b!(j−a)! resources of weight 1, finally
Ra+b+1 consists of a single resource of weight b + 1. Any player from Nj , j ∈
{1, . . . , a + b} can choose from exactly 2 sets, each consisting of one resource;
one is a resource in Rj , and one is a resource in Rj+1. Each resource in R1
can be chosen only by one player in N1. Each resource in Rj , j ∈ {2, . . . , a}
can be chosen by one player in Nj and one player in Nj−1. Each resource in
Rj , j ∈ {a+ 1, . . . , a+ b} can be chosen by exactly j − a+ 1 players; 1 from Nj ,
and j − a from Nj−1. Finally, the only resource in Ra+b+1 can be chosen only
by the single player in Na+b. Players are ordered by the number of their subset;
players in N1 choose first, then players in N2, etc. The order of players within
subsets is irrelevant. This example is shown in Figure 4, for a = 3, b = 3. /
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Fig. 4. This example shows that the SPoA is at least 2 + 1/e (asymptotically). Players
are denoted by dots, and resources by squares. The number in each resource denotes
its weight wr, and fat lines indicate the actions. Here, constant costs dr = 0
It is easy to see that the social optimum is obtained when each player in Nj , j ∈
{1, . . . , a+b} chooses a resource in Rj , since then each player chooses the resource
with the lowest cost, and no resource is chosen by more than one player. This
yields a total cost of
∑b
j=1(
b!
j! )+(
∑a
j=2(2
j−a−1)+2−a+1)b! =
∑b
j=1(
b!
j! )+b!. How-
ever, it is a subgame perfect equilibrium when each player inNj , j ∈ {0, . . . , a+b}
chooses a resource in Rj+1; each player in N1 has a cost of 2
−a+1, while by devi-
ating, he has a cost of 2−a+1 as well. Each player in Nj , j ∈ {2, . . . , a} has a cost
of 2j−a, while by deviating, he has a cost of 2j−a−1 ·2 = 2j−a as well. Each player
in Nj , j ∈ {a+ 1, . . . , a+ b− 1} has a cost of 1(j− a+ 1), while by deviating, he
has a cost of 1(j − a+ 1) as well. Finally, the only player in Na+b has a cost of
(b+ 1)1, while by deviating, he has a cost of 1(b+ 1) as well. This yields a total
cost of
∑b
j=1(
b!
j! (j+ 1)) +
∑a
j=1(2
−j+1b!) =
∑b
j=1(
b!
j! (j+ 1)) + b!(2− 2−a+1). We
see that
SPoA ≥
∑b
j=1
b!
j! (j + 1) + b!(2− 2−a+1)∑b
j=1
b!
j! + b!
.
Letting a→∞ we obtain
SPoA ≥
∑b
j=1
b!
j! (j + 1) + 2b!∑b
j=1
b!
j! + b!
.
Finally for b→∞, we conclude
lim
b→∞
∑b
j=1
b!
j! (j + 1) + 2b!∑b
j=1
b!
j! + b!
= lim
b→∞
∑b
j=1
j+1
j! + 2∑b
j=1
1
j! + 1
= lim
b→∞
∑b
j=0
j+1
j! + 1∑b
j=0
1
j!
,
which equals 2e+1e by standard calculus. Therefore SPoA ≥ 2 + 1e ≈ 2.37. uunionsq
6.2 An Upper Bound for Singleton Congestion Games
For the special case of singleton congestion games, we obtain the following.
Theorem 4. For singleton atomic congestion games with affine cost functions,
SPoA ≤ n− 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. See the appendix, Section C. uunionsq
Note that this is not much tighter than the trivial upper bound n that already
holds for general congestion games. It gives a small improvement, though, for
the case of n = 3 players over the upper bound 2 63488 .
6.3 Singleton Congestion Games with Symmetric Players
Here we prove the following theorem for the special case of singleton, symmetric
congestion games.
Theorem 5. For symmetric singleton atomic congestion games with affine cost
functions, SPoA = 4/3.
To prove the theorem, we first derive a more general result
Theorem 6. For symmetric singleton atomic congestion games with non-de-
creasing latency functions, every subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive
form game is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic form game4.
Proof. Intuitively our proof is as follows: we show that for any player i for
which there exists a resource r′ in the SPE outcome that is less costly than the
resource r that he chose, we can find a successor j for which there also exists
a less expensive resource in the SPE outcome in the subgame where player i
chooses r′. With this, we construct a contradiction. Let us call a player ex-post
discontent if, in the SPE outcome, there exists such a less expensive resource for
that player. For simplicity of notation, let us assume that the set of all instances
contains all subgames as well.
Among all instances that would falsify the claim, choose an instance I which,
among all such instances has the smallest number of players succeeding the
last ex-post discontent player, i. Denote by A the outcome of the SPE in that
instance. Let r be the resource that player i chooses in the SPE, and let r′ be the
ex-post more attractive resource for player i. Denote by A′ the resulting outcome
when only player i deviates ex-post (note that this is not an equilibrium). Denote
by A′′ the outcome of the SPE of the subgame where players preceding i choose
the same actions as in A, and player i chooses r′ (again, this is not an equlibrium,
but it is subgame perfect for the corresponding subgame for players succeeding
i). Figure 5 may help to illustrate this.
We argue that in A′′ at least one successor j of i chooses r′ as well, since
fr′(A
′) < fr(A) ≤ fr′(A′′). The first inequality follows from the fact that player i
improves in the strategic form game by choosing r′ over r. The second inequality
follows from the fact that it is subgame perfect for player i to choose r in the
extensive form game. Therefore we may conclude that nr′(A) < nr′(A
′′).
Denote by T the set of resources chosen in A by players succeeding i. For any
resource r′′ ∈ T we have fr′′(A) < fr(A), since otherwise some successor j of i
can decrease his cost by deviating to r′ in the strategic form game, contradicting
the fact that i has the fewest successors among all ex-post discontent players. We
now compare outcomes A and A′′. Since nr′(A) < nr′(A′′), and all predecessors
of i choose the same resource in A as in A′′, there exists a resource r′′ ∈ T
for which nr′′(A) > nr′′(A
′′). Now suppose that player j deviates ex-post and
chooses r′′ instead of r′. Denote the resulting outcome by A′′′. We get nr′′(A′′′) =
nr′′(A
′′) + 1 ≤ nr′′(A), therefore fr′′(A′′′) ≤ fr′′(A) which yields fr′′(A′′′) ≤
fr′′(A) < fr(A) ≤ fr′(A′′). We see that ex-post deviating decreases the cost of
player j. Since j is a successor of i, this contradicts the fact that i has the fewest
successors among all ex-post discontent players. This contradicts the choice of I.
uunionsq
4 What we mean here is the non-sequential strategic form game where the strategies
of all players are just single actions.
r r′ r′′
i
r r′ r′′
i
j
r r′ r′′
i
r r′ r′′
i
j
A A′
A′′ A′′′
Fig. 5. This example depicts the 4 outcomes used in theorem 5. Dots represent players,
and squares represent resources. When a player is positioned above a resource, that
player chooses that resource.
Proof (for Theorem 5). The upper bound follows from Theorem 6, and the fact
that PoA = 4/3, which follows from [7]. The following lower bound example shows
that this bound is tight. There are 2 players and 2 resources, w1 = 1, w2 = 2. It
is optimal when either resource is chosen by one player, yielding cost(OPT ) =
1+2 = 3. However, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, both players chose resource
1, yielding cost(SPE) = 2 + 2 = 4. We obtain SPoA ≥ 4/3. uunionsq
congestion game # players PoA SPoA
general n = 2 2[5, 2] 1.5
general n = 3 2.5[5, 2] 2 63
488
singleton n ≥ 3 2.5[4] ≤ n− 1
singleton n→∞ 2.5[4] ≥ 2 1
e
singleton & symmetric n ≥ 2 4/3 [7] 4/3
Fig. 6. Results for the SPoA in comparison to the PoA.
7 Conclusion
We see that for atomic congestion games with two or three players, the sequential
price of anarchy is lower than the price of anarchy. We conjecture this to be
true also for more than three players. We think it is a good guess that 2 + 1/e
is the answer also in general, and as long as an analytic proof is lacking, the
conjecture can be backed by more extensive computational experiments (with a
finite number of players). Figure 6 gives a brief overview.
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A ILP Formulation for 3 players
Here we give the ILP formulation we use in section 5. In the formulation, we de-
note by A the set of all actions ⋃i∈N Ai. The ILP uses 22+3+7 = 4096 resources
R, one for every combination of actions. Note that here we denote actions by
lowercase letters a, b, and c, because they appear as index to the decision vari-
ables. We use binary parameters δar to specify whether resource r is chosen in
action a. For each resource r, we have decision variables dr and wr, the constant
cost and weight of r, respectively.
We denote by va =
∑
r∈R δar(wr+dr) the cost of a player that chooses action
a without taking any other players’ actions into consideration. Next, we denote
by oab =
∑
r∈R δarδbrwr the additional costs that two players with actions a and
b incur due to overlap in resources. We use these auxiliary variables to determine
the total cost of player i, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, when players 1, 2 and 3 choose actions
a, b and c, respectively. This we denote by costi(a, b, c).
We define the outcome where each player chooses his first action (1, 1, 1) as
the social optimum with total costs normalized to 1. We use binary variables
x1a, x
2
ab and x
3
abc to determine which actions are subgame perfect. For example,
x2ab = 0 whenever action b is subgame perfect for player 2, anticipating a subgame
perfect action of player 3, and knowing that player 1 has chosen action a, and
x2ab = 1 otherwise.
Finally, cost1(a) and cost2(ab) determine the cost of actions of players 1 and
2 respectively, when successors play subgame perfect. For instance, cost2(ab)
denotes the cost of action b for player 2, when player 1 chooses action a, and
player 3 plays subgame perfect, given actions a and b of players 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Finally costSPE determines the sum of costs for all players in the outcome
corresponding to the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Parameters
δar ∀r ∈ R,∀a ∈ A
{
0 if r ∈ A
1 otherwise
Variables
wr ∀r ∈ R the weight of resource r
dr ∀r ∈ R the constant cost of resource r
va ∀a ∈ A the total constant cost plus weight of all resources in a
oab ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ A, a 6= b the total weight of resources that are in a and b
costi(abc) ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3, i ∈ N the costs of player i when players
1,2,3 choose a, b, c respectively
costSPE the total costs in the SPE.
cost1(a) ∀a ∈ A1 the costs of player 1 when he plays a
and 2, 3 play subgame perfect
cost2(ab) ∀a ∈ A1,∀b ∈ A2 the costs of player 2 when players
1, 2 play a, b respectively
and 3 plays subgame perfect
x1a ∀a ∈ A1
{
0 if a is subgame perfect for player 1
1 otherwise
x2ab ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2
{
0 if ab is subgame perfect for player 2
1 otherwise
x3abc ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3
{
0 if abc is subgame perfect for player 3
1 otherwise
Constraints
va =
∑
r∈R
δar(wr + dr) ∀a ∈ A (3)
oab =
∑
r∈R
δarδbrwr ∀a ∈ A,∀b ∈ A, a 6= b (4)
(5)
cost1(abc) = va + oab + oac ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (6)
cost2(abc) = vb + oab + obc ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (7)
cost3(abc) = vc + oac + obc ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (8)
cost1(111) + cost2(111) + cost3(111) = 1 (9)
cost1(abc) + cost2(abc) + cost3(abc) ≥ 1 ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (10)
∑
a∈A1
x1a ≤ |A1| − 1 (11)∑
b∈A2
x2ab ≤ |A2| − 1 ∀a ∈ A1 (12)∑
c∈A3
x3abc ≤ |A3| − 1 ∀a ∈ A1,∀b ∈ A2 (13)
cost3(abc) ≤ cost3(abc′) +M · x3abc ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3, c′ ∈ A3 (14)
cost2(ab) ≤ cost2(ab′) +M · x2ab ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, b′ ∈ A2 (15)
cost1(a) ≤ cost1(a′) +M · x1a ∀a ∈ A1, a′ ∈ A1 (16)
cost1(a) ≤ cost1(abc) +M · (x2ab + x3abc) ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (17)
cost1(a) ≥ cost1(abc)−M · (x2ab + x3abc) ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (18)
cost2(ab) ≤ cost2(abc) +M · x3abc ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (19)
cost2(ab) ≥ cost2(abc)−M · x3abc ∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (20)
costSPE ≤ cost1(abc) + cost2(abc) + cost3(abc) +M · (x1a + x2ab + x3abc)
∀a ∈ A1, b ∈ A2, c ∈ A3 (21)
Constraints (3) and (4) define va and oab for all actions a, b. Constraints
(6),(7), and (8) define the costs in each outcome for each player. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the costs such that the optimal solution is the outcome
(1, 1, 1) and has total cost equal to 1 in constraints (9) and (10). Constraints
(11),(12), and (13) make sure that there exists at least one subgame perfect
action for each player. Constraints (14),(15), and (16) make sure no player can
improve from any subgame perfect action; when action c is subgame perfect when
players 1, 2 choose actions a, b respectively, then cost3(abc) ≤ cost3(abc′) for any
action c′. When action b is subgame perfect for player 2 when player 1 chooses
action a, then cost2(ab) ≤ cost2(ab′) for all actions b′. When action a is sub-
game perfect for player 1, then cost1(a) ≤ cost1(a′) for all actions a′. Constraints
(17) and (18) define cost1(i); if actions b and c are subgame perfect for players
2, 3 respectively, when player 1 chooses action a, then cost1(a) = cost1(abc).
Constraints (17) and (18) define cost2(ab); if c is subgame perfect for player 3,
when players 1, 2 chooses actions a, b respectively, then cost2(ab) = cost2(abc).
Constraint (21) defines costSPE ; if actions a, b, c are subgame perfect for players
1, 2, 3 respectively, then costSPE = cost1(abc)+cost2(abc)+cost3(abc). Since we
maximize costSPE , an inequality suffices. Constraints (14) to (20), are ‘big M’
constraints; if any binary variable equals 1 (in which case the corresponding ac-
tion is not subgame perfect), then the constraint does not impose any restriction.
Due to lemma 5, M = n suffices.
Objective
The objective is to maximize costSPE , since, due to the normalization, this value
equals the sequential price of anarchy.
B Lower Bound Example for 3 players
Here we give the lower bound example that we use in Section 5, scaled to integers
such that cost(OPT ) = 488.
Example 4. There are 13 resources {1, . . . , 13} with weights w1 = 84, w2 =
52, w3 = 3, w4 = 4, w5 = 31, w6 = 52, w7 = 54, w8 = 92, w9 = 51, w10 =
28, w11 = 4, w12 = 33, w13 = 374. Player 1 has 2 actions {1.1, 1.2}. Player 2 has
3 actions {2.1, 2.2, 2.3}. Player 3 has 4 actions {3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4}. Table 1 shows
for each action, which resources it contains. This example is shown in Figure 7.
Calculating the costs of all actions in the game tree yields a SPoA where
player 1 chooses 1.2, player 2 chooses 2.3, and player 3 chooses 3.4, yielding a
total cost of C(SPoA) = 1039. Therefore SPoA = 1039488 = 2
63
488 . The game tree is
shown in Figure 8.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1.1 v v
1.2 v v v v v v v
2.1 v v v v v
2.2 v v v v
2.3 v v v v v v v
3.1 v v v v v
3.2 v v v v v v
3.3 v v v v v
3.4 v v
Table 1. v denotes that the corresponding action contains the corresponding resource
4 33
54 92
314
28
52
3
84 52
374
51
3.2
3.1
3.3
2.3
2.2
1.2
3.4
1.1
2.1
Fig. 7. The lower bound example for 3 players. Squares correspond to resources. The
number in each resource denotes its weight. Encircled areas correspond to actions.
174 401 401 440 345 407345345 264 491 491 407 317 317 317 440 488 261 261 407 407 407 407 407
171 171 520 346 346 346
286 286
Player 3
Player 2
Player 1
OPT SPE
Fig. 8. The game tree for three players. The number at each action denotes the cost of
the corresponding player when all successors play subgame perfect. Fat lines correspond
to subgame perfect actions.
C An Upper Bound For Singleton Congestion Games
with n > 3 Players
Here we prove the upper bound n− 1 for singleton congestion games. We start
with the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Suppose players 1, . . . , i choose resources r1, . . . , ri, and suppose it
is subgame perfect for every player j succeeding i to choose ri. Then it is also
subgame perfect for every player j succeeding i to choose ri, when players 1, . . . , i
choose r1, . . . ri−1, r′i instead.
Proof. Denote by A the outcome when players 1 . . . i choose resources r1, . . . , ri,
and every player j succeeding i chooses ri. Suppose the lemma is false, and sup-
pose players 1 . . . i choose r1, . . . , ri−1, r′i. Then, for any subgame perfect equi-
librium for players i + 1, . . . , n, there exists a last player j that chooses some
resource rj 6= ri. Now compared to A, player i does not choose ri, no additional
players choose ri, and resources other than ri are chosen at least as often. There-
fore, for player j, ri costs less than in A, while other resources cost as least as
much as in A, no matter what the players succeeding j will do. In A, however,
choosing ri was subgame perfect. Therefore, it cannot be subgame perfect for j
to choose rj instead of ri. This is a contradiction. uunionsq
Using this lemma, we lower bound the utility of players in the optimum in
the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Consider an instance where there exists a player i, such that it is
subgame perfect for every player preceding i to choose r∗i , and if players 1 . . . i
choose resources r∗i , . . . , r
∗
i , then it is subgame perfect for every player succeeding
i to choose r∗i . Then for any player k 6= i either i chooses r∗k in SPE, or we have
dr∗k +wr∗k ≥ dr∗i + (n− 1)wr∗i . Here r∗i and r∗k denote the resources players i and
k choose in the optimum solution, respectively.
Proof. Suppose there exists such a player i. Due to Lemma 7, there exists a
subgame perfect equilibrium SPE, where each player other than i chooses r∗i
(and i chooses some resource, which is either r∗i or some other resource). Consider
resource r∗k for some player k. Denote the set of players that can choose r
∗
k by
N ′. Since k can choose r∗k, N
′ is not empty, therefore it has a last player j.
Now, suppose in SPE, player i does not choose r∗k. Then player j can choose r
∗
k,
obtaining cost dr∗k + wr∗k . Since he obtains a cost of dr∗k + wr∗k instead, we see
that dr∗k + wr∗k ≥ dr∗i + (n− 1)wr∗i , proving the lemma. uunionsq
Now we are ready to prove the theorem.
Theorem 4. For singleton atomic congestion games with affine cost functions,
SPoA ≤ n− 1.
Proof. Denote by r∗i the resource player i chooses in the optimum solution. Sup-
pose SPoA > n − 1. Then there exists at least one player i with costi(SPE) >
(n− 1) costi(OPT ) ≥ (n− 1)(dr∗i + wr∗i ) ≥ dr∗i + (n− 1)wr∗i . Therefore in SPE,
each player j preceding i chooses r∗i , and, if player i chooses r
∗
i , it is subgame
perfect for each player k succeeding i to choose r∗i . If in SPE player i chooses
r∗i , then cost(SPE) = ndr∗i + n
2wr∗i . If player i chooses another resource, then
player i does not incur a higher cost, while all other players incur a smaller cost.
Therefore cost(SPE) ≤ ndr∗i + n2wr∗i .
Since costi(SPE) > dr∗i + (n− 1)wr∗i , due to lemma 8, we have d(r∗k) +w(r∗k) ≥
dr∗i +(n−1)wr∗i ∀k ∈ N . Therefore cost(OPT ) =
∑
j 6=i costj(OPT )+costi(OPT ) ≥∑
j 6=i(dr∗i + (n− 1)wr∗i ) + dr∗i + wr∗i = ndr∗i + ((n− 1)2 + 1)wr∗i .
Finally
SPoA ≤ cost(SPE)cost(OPT ) ≤
ndr∗
i
+n2wr∗
i
ndr∗
i
+((n−2)2+1)wr∗
i
≤ n− 1 for n ≥ 3. This contradicts our
assumption. Therefore SPoA ≤ n− 1 for n ≥ 3. uunionsq
